



























We extend the results of the Coase theorem to the relation-
ships where, due to contractual incompleteness, agents are unable
to bargain over all aspects of the transaction. We show that the
initial allocation of ownership rights is irrelevant if a suﬃciently
large surplus is created by cooperation. Our result contrasts with
Grossman and Hart (1986), who, using a similar model, obtain
that the ownership rights should be allocated to minimize ex-ante
ineﬃciencies in production. The critical element behind these two
diﬀerent results is that while Grossman and Hart (1986) model
uses the Nash bargaining solution treating status quo payoﬀsa s
disagreement points, here they are treated as outside options.
Our model also shows that, when relevant, asset ownership may
provide disincentive to invest as in De Meza and Lockwood (1998)
and Chiu (1998).
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
There has been contrasting theoretical results on the relationship be-
tween asset ownership and investment incentives. The seminal work of
Grossman and Hart (1986) (GH, hereafter), followed by Hart and Moore
(1990), and Hart (1995), argued that asset ownership boosts incentives
to invest. However, De Meza and Lockwood (1998) and Chiu (1998),
(DLC, hereafter) have shown that in certain environments, asset own-
ership may in fact reduce incentives to invest. This paper, in addition
to obtaining DLC results in a diﬀerent setting, presents a case where
asset ownership does not aﬀect investment incentives, despite the fact
that investments are productive. It also contributes to understanding
the relationship between asset ownership and investment incentives by
disentangling the eﬀects of production complementarity and investment
productivity.
The model in this paper draws on GH where a theory of ownership
rights is developed and is applied to a ﬁrm’s decision to integrate ver-
tically or horizontally. They consider a relationship between two ﬁrms
whose productive activities are dependent on each other. Ex-ante both
ﬁr m sm a k ear e l a t i o n s h i p - s p e c i ﬁc investment and, ex-post they make a
decision regarding the production process. Due to high transaction costs,
ex-ante contracts contingent on the choice variables cannot be written.
However, once the ex-ante investments have been made, the ex-post pro-
duction decision becomes contractible. Thus the agents can bargain over
the division of surplus before the production decisions are made. In the
model, they deﬁne a ﬁrm as a set of property rights over the physical
assets that it owns. Ownership confers residual control rights over the
assets in the sense that, the owner of the asset has the right to use it
in whichever way he desires unless speciﬁcr i g h t sa r ec o n t r a c t e da w a y .
S i n c en o n eo ft h ev a r i a b l e sa r ee x - a n t ec o n t r a c t i b l e ,t h ei n i t i a lc o n t r a c t
only speciﬁes the allocation of the residual control rights. Through its
eﬀect on the use of the asset in uncontracted states, ownership rights
inﬂuence agent’s bargaining power and the division of ex-post surplus,
w h i c hi nt u r na ﬀects the parties’ incentives to invest in that relationship.
If there is a reciprocal dependency between the production of both ﬁrms,
integration improves the incentives of the new owner while it weakens
t h ei n c e n t i v e so ft h ea c q u i r e dﬁrm’s ex-owner. This trade-oﬀ between
the costs and beneﬁts of ownership determines the optimal allocation of
control rights, hence ownership.
2The main conclusion of GH is that the ownership rights should be
allocated to minimize the ex-ante ineﬃciencies in production and assets
should be owned by the agent whose ex-ante investment is the most
productive in the relationship. This result is driven by the particular
equilibrium of the bargaining game that GH have considered. They con-
sidered Nash bargaining where the status quo payoﬀs, which is the payoﬀ
received by an agent prior to bargaining, is treated as the disagreement
point to the Nash solution1. When the status quo payoﬀsa r et a k e n
as the disagreement point of the Nash solution, the agent’s equilibrium
payoﬀ,w h i c hw ec a l la st h e“split-the-diﬀerence” payoﬀ,i st h es u mo f
h i ss t a t u sq u op a y o ﬀ and half of the diﬀerence between the total surplus
and both agents’ status quo payoﬀs. This can be an equilibrium of a
bargaining game in which the agents receive their status quo payoﬀsa t
every period where an agreement has not been reached. However, if the
agents do not receive an income ﬂow in the course of the bargaining or
there is no exogenous risk of breakdown, then the disagreement payoﬀ,
which is the payoﬀ from a perpetual negotiation without an agreement,
should be zero. In this case, the agents can obtain their status quo pay-
oﬀ only if they quit the bargaining game unilaterally to implement the
status quo. When the status quo payoﬀs are taken as outside options,
they determine the range of validity for the Nash solution. When neither
agents’ outside option is binding, both receive half of the total surplus,
which we call “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ. When only one agent’s outside
option is binding, he receives his outside option and the opponent claims
the residual. In this paper, we replace the Nash bargaining with an ex-
plicit alternating oﬀers bargaining game where status quo payoﬀsa r e
treated as outside options.
This has been argued earlier by DLC and they have shown that asset
ownership does not necessarily boost incentive to invest. In some cases,
asset ownership may act as "stick" rather than "carrot" in De Meza and
Lockwood (1998) terminology. In this paper, we reinforce the results of
DLC on the disincentive eﬀects of asset ownership. However, our model
is based on the original model used in GH rather than the model in Hart
(1995) which is a special case of the former in some sense. In Hart (1995)
the ex-post production decisions are merely a decision on the choice of
1As it has been previously argued in Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1989), Sutton
(1986), a dynamic bargaining game diﬀerentiates between a disagreement point and
an outside option.
3the trading partner, i.e.: whether to trade with the existing partner or
outsider. Hence the right to exercise residual control rights is rather
limited.
Moreover, our model also characterize a case where the initial al-
location of ownership is irrelevant. If production complementarity and
investment productivity are both important in the relationship, then
we have a Coasean prediction that applies to an incomplete contracting
environment. In other words, this model predicts the irrelevance of the
ownership structure in a vertical structures like a mine-mouth electricity
generation where production complementarity and investment produc-
tivity are equally important to both parties. In GH model the Coase
theorem fails to apply because of the existence of transaction costs that
are created by the agents’ opportunistic behavior during bargaining. In
this paper, we show that the Coase theorem partly applies despite the
presence of contractual incompleteness, for the agents cannot reach to
Pareto eﬃciency through bargaining. Regardless of the allocation of
ownership rights, when the size of the surplus is endogenous, the bar-
gaining results in an ineﬃcient equilibrium because of the free rider
problem. As parties do not receive the full beneﬁt of their actions, their
incentives to invest are distorted. In this paper, we are not interested in
ineﬃciencies of this kind but in those that are solely driven by the allo-
cation of ownership rights. Our model predicts that, while the ex-ante
investments are ineﬃcient, the initial allocation of ownership rights is
irrelevant.2
The paper also unveils the two intertwined factors that aﬀect the
optimal distribution of ownership; investment productivity and comple-
mentarity in production. Whether an outside option is binding or not
depends on both the degree of complementarity between the ex-post
productive activities and ex-ante investment levels. If complementarity
2In this model, we adopt the deﬁnition of ownership, which is the power to exercise
control, used in GH. Ownership, however, can also be identiﬁed with the rights to the
residual income stream. As argued by Holmstrom and Tirole (1989), the deﬁnition
of ownership can be a critical element in analyzing the eﬃciency properties of the
initial allocation of ownership rights. Several papers, such as Holmstrom and Tirole
(1989), Bolton and Whinston (1993), ﬁnd that the initial allocation of ownership
rights over physical assets have eﬃciency implications. In these papers, however,
ownership is deﬁned as the rights to the both residual control and return stream. It
would be interesting to examine the extent to which the irrelevance result depends
on the deﬁnition of ownership.
4is reciprocal and large then, regardless of the distribution of ownership,
it is more likely that ex-post renegotiation produces a suﬃciently large
surplus at almost all investment levels. In this case, neither party’s out-
side option is binding and both parties gets “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ.
Hence, the distribution of ownership is irrelevant. However, if the rela-
tionship is asymmetric, in the sense that i’s action is signiﬁcant for j but
not vice versa, it is more likely that j’s outside option will be binding
under j’s ownership. It is optimal to give the assets to agent j only if i’s
investment is more productive relative to j’s investment. Therefore opti-
mal ownership of an asset does not just depend on whether investments
are productive but also whether ex-post production exhibits signiﬁcant
complementarity as well. These two eﬀects cannot be separated in the
De Meza and Lockwood (1998) model but rather their combined aﬀect is
represented by assets being productive or unproductive outside relation-
ship. This is because, in their model, the ex-post production decision is
reduced down to the choice of trading partner, inside or outside, whereas
in many situation ex-post production may involve complex design deci-
sions that are not contractible ex-ante.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the formal model
is introduced. In section 3, the equilibrium to the induced bargaining
subgame is derived in the case of non-integration. Section 4 contains the
equilibrium of the investment-choice game in the case of non-integration.
Section 5 considers integration, in particular we analyze the case in which
ﬁrm 1 owns ﬁrm 2. In Section 6, we compare the two ownership struc-
tures and discuss the relationship between asset ownership and invest-
ment incentives. In Section 7, we look at the comparative statics as we
change the level of complementarity between the two ﬁrm, in order to
characterize when the equilibrium exist. Section 8 contains concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
As in the GH model, we consider two ﬁrms, 1 and 2, that are engaged in
a relationship which lasts 2 periods. Each ﬁrm is managed by an agent
who receives the full return of the ﬁr mw h e r eh ei se m p l o y e d . A tt h e
beginning of date 1, the two agents sign a contract that speciﬁes the dis-
tribution of ownership rights over each ﬁrm’s assets. After the contract
is signed, the two agents make a relationship-speciﬁc investment which
is denoted by ai for i =1 ,2. We assume that the relationship-speciﬁc
5investments require special skills so that the investment ai in ﬁrm ican
only be made by agent i. At date 2, the investments become observ-
able to both agents and some further decisions regarding the production
process are made, which are denoted by qi. Although ai is chosen by
agent i, the ex-post decision, qi, is made by the agent who owns ﬁrm
i.I ft h eﬁrms are separately owned, that is if agent i owns ﬁrm i,e a c h
agent is an owner-manager who has residual control rights over its ﬁrm’s
physical assets, so agent i chooses ai and qi of ﬁrm i.I f t h e ﬁrms are
integrated under i’s ownership then agent i owns both ﬁrms 1 and 2 then
agent j becomes his employee. For example, under 1’s ownership, agent
1 chooses a1, q1 and q2 and agent 2chooses a2. The private beneﬁtt o
agent i is written as Bi [ai,φ i(q1,q 2)]. The function φi can be thought of
as a monetary payoﬀ from second stage production net of costs. There is
a disutility associated with ex-ante investment, which is given by vi (ai).3
All costs and beneﬁt sa r em e a s u r e di nd a t e1 dollars. The beneﬁts and
costs are the same under any ownership structure. Moreover, ownership
does not provide any additional beneﬁt.
None of the variables ai, qi and Bi is contractible ex-ante. We assume
that the non-contractibility of the variables arises either as a result of
high transaction costs associated with writing comprehensive contracts,
or because of enforcement problems. We regard ai as the non-veriﬁable
managerial eﬀort which is non-contractible because of the enforcement
problem. The variable qi is ex-ante non-contractible because it stands
for complex production decision and it is diﬃcult to describe ex-ante.
Since the decision variables are ex-ante non-contractible, the date
0 contract can only allocate ownership rights between the two agent.
Ownership of an asset grants the beholder the right to use it in any way
he desires unless these rights are contracted away. In GH’s terminology,
t h eo w n e ro ft h ea s s e th a st h eresidual control rights over that asset.4
Although qi is ex-ante non-contractible, once the state of the world is
observed, qi becomes contractible and the owner of ﬁrm i may give up
his residual control rights in exchange of a side-payment.
As u m m a r yo ft h es e q u e n c eo fe v e n t si sa sf o l l o w s . A td a t e0 ,a
3In GH model, Bi [ai,φ i(q1,q 2)] denotes the beneﬁts net of all costs including the
disutility of ex ante investment. In our model we preferred to separate the disutility
from the beneﬁt function to simplify the analysis. This structural change in the
payoﬀ function would not change the GH result.
4Note that in this model, ﬁnancial returns are not transferable with ownership.
For an example of this, see Holmstrom and Tirole (1989).
6contract is signed. After that, a1 and a2 are chosen simultaneously and
independently. At date 1, each agent learns the amount invested by his
opponent. Before the actual choices of qi are made they become con-
tractible. If there is no further negotiation, the agent who owns ﬁrm
i chooses qi independently. The second stage decision, q, however, be-
comes contractible at date 1. Thus, a new contract may be negotiated
that implements diﬀerent choices of q1 and q2, and speciﬁes how the sur-
plus is divided. Then B1 and B2 are realized and the necessary transfers
are made between the two agents according to the new contract.
The following technical assumptions guarantee that the optimization
problems have unique solutions and ﬁrst-order necessary conditions are
suﬃcient. We assume that Bi [ai,φ i(q1,q 2)] and vi (ai) are twice continu-
ously diﬀerentiable and satisfy the following assumptions for all ai ∈ Ai
and qi ∈ Qi.
Assumption 1: Bi (·) is increasing in φi and ai. B1 [·]+B2 [·] is strictly
concave in its four arguments, (a1,a 2,q 1,q 2).
Assumption 2: The cost function vi (ai) is increasing and convex in
ai.
Assuming that monetary transfers between agents are available, the
optimal contract maximizes the total ex-ante net beneﬁts of the two
agents
W = B1 [a1,φ 1 (q1,q 2)] + B2 [a2,φ 2 (q1,q 2)] − v1 (a1) − v2 (a2). (1)
If we assume that a1 and a2 are veriﬁable, and q1 and q2 are ex-ante
contractible, the ﬁr s tb e s ts o l u t i o nw h i c hi so b t a i n e db ym a x i m i z i n g( 1 )




1 ,a n dqF
2 a st h eu n i q u em a x i m i z e r so fW subject to ai ∈ Ai,
and qi ∈ Qi for i =1 ,2.
S i n c ew eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a ta l ld a t e1variables are non-contractible
as of date 0, the ﬁrst-best cannot be implemented. The initial contract
only allocates ownership rights over ﬁrms’ assets. There are three cases
to consider. In the ﬁrst case which we call non-integration, the ﬁrms are
separately owned. In the second and third cases the ﬁrms are integrated
under the ownership of a single agent, 1 and 2 respectively.5
5We perceive ownership as a discrete variable which takes the value either 0 or 1
for each agent. Either agent 1 or agent 2 owns the ﬁrm. Two agent cannot own the
same ﬁrm at the same time. Therefore we do not consider any type of joint ownership
structure.
73N o n - i n t e g r a t i o n
We solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the full game which
is characterized by a vector of (a,q) ∈ A × Q and transfer payments.
Each vector a =( a1,a 2) induces a proper subgame where agent 1 and
2 bargain over the division of total surplus. We call these subgames as
the induced bargaining subgames. In the next section, we characterize
the equilibrium payoﬀs in these bargaining subgames.
3.1 The induced bargaining subgames
I nt h ec a s ew h e r et h eﬁrms are separately owned, agent i has the right
to choose qi. At date 1, the two agents choose q1 and q2 to maximize
B1 [a1,φ 1 (q1,q 2)] and B2 [a2,φ 2 (q1,q 2)], respectively.6 We assume that








In general, the non-cooperative solution (ˆ q1, ˆ q2) is ex-post ineﬃcient.7
Therefore the two parties can gain from negotiating a new contract that
speciﬁes (q1 (a),q 2 (a)) as the actions to be taken, where
(q1(a),q 2(a)) = argmax{B1 [a1,φ 1 (q1,q 2)] + B2 [a2,φ 2 (q1,q 2)]} (3)
is the equilibrium of the cooperative q-choice subgame. The vector of
equilibrium actions (q1 (a),q 2 (a)) is unique given that B(.) function is
concave. The new contract is feasible, since q1 and q2 are ex-post con-
tractible. Let B[a,q(a)] denote the value function of this problem. The
division of B[a,q(a)] among the two agents is determined by an alter-
nating oﬀers bargaining game. In the next section we explain the details
of the game.
6We assume that the q-choice game is a Cournot game. If agent i chooses to
quit the bargaining game ﬁrst and implement his outside option, he chooses qi to
maximize Bi [ai,φ i (a1,a2)].A g e n tj chooses qj before she observes qi.T h u s ,i nt h e
q-choice game q1 and q2 are chosen simultaneously. Alternatively, we could model
the q-choice game as a Stackelberg game. If, in the bargaining game, qi becomes
observable before qj is chosen, in the q-choice game q1 and q2 are chosen sequentially.
This modiﬁcation, however, would not change the results obtained.
7The noncooperative choices are eﬃcient when φi is a function of only qi or when
φi = φj, that is the both agents have the same payoﬀ function.
83.1.1 Bargaining Game
In the GH model the solution to the contract negotiation is characterized
by the Nash bargaining solution where the status quo payoﬀs are treated
as disagreement payoﬀs. In this equilibrium each agent receives half of
















Such an equilibrium can be obtained as the solution to an alternating
oﬀers bargaining game where each agent receives the status quo payoﬀs
at each period in which the agreement has not been reached. However
if one considers a bargaining game where the agents do not receive any
income ﬂow until they reach an agreement or there is no exogenous risk
of breakdown then it is more natural to treat the status quo payoﬀs
as outside options. While a disagreement payoﬀ directly inﬂuence the
division of the surplus in the equilibrium, an outside option inﬂuences the
division of the surplus only when it is a credible threat. In other words,
if a player obtains a higher payoﬀ from exercising his outside option
than the equilibrium payoﬀ he receives when he continues to bargain,
his outside option constitutes a credible threat. Otherwise, quitting is
not a credible threat. In the former case, he should at least receive
the value of his outside option in any subgame-perfect equilibrium of
the bargaining game. In the latter case, his outside option does not
inﬂuence the equilibrium of the game.8
Lemma 1 Given the initial ownership structure, and the vector a =
(a1,a 2) of of ex-ante investment levels, the induced bargaining subgame
has a unique equilibrium in which the agreement is reached immediately,
and ﬁrm 1 receives p, given by
p =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩



























Proof. See Shaked and Sutton (1984).
8This issue has been discussed by Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1989). See also
Sutton (1986), and Shaked and Sutton (1984).
9When both outside options are small relative to the “split-the-surplus”
solution, as in the ﬁrst case, both agents prefer to continue bargaining
than quitting. This would generally be the case when the surplus cre-
ated by cooperation is large. In the second case agent 1 quits because
he receives greater payoﬀ in the status quo than if they split the surplus.
In other words, his outside option imposes a credible threat, so that he
receives his outside option in a perfect equilibrium. In the third case,
agent 2 prefers quitting. She receives a share equal to her outside option,
while agent 1 claims the residual. In general, when δ ∈ (0,1),r e g a r d -
less of the preferences of agent 1, agent 2 has the ﬁrst mover advantage
in using her outside option as a credible threat. When δ approaches 0
this advantage disappears. When agent 1’s outside option is binding,
agent 2’s outside option cannot be binding. This contradicts with the
assumption that cooperation generates greater surplus.
As opposed to GH’s “split-the-diﬀerence” solution, we ﬁnd that the
outside option has no eﬀect on the bargaining outcome if it does not
constitute a credible threat. Since the optimal allocation of ownership
rights heavily depends on the outcome of the negotiation, the way outside
option is incorporated into the model is critical.
Given the initial ownership structure and the ex-ante choice of (a1,a 2),
we let Πi (a1,a 2) denote the overall payoﬀ to agent i obtained from the
induced bargaining subgame. In the rest of the paper, we analyze the
game from agent i’s perspective, where j denotes











as agent i’s share in the "split-the-surplus" solution. Then, using Lemma





Hi (a1,a 2) − vi (ai) if j’s o. o. is binding,





− vi (ai)if i’s o. o. is binding.
(7)
There is a qualitative diﬀerence in the way the ex-ante investments
aﬀect the payoﬀso ft h ep a r t i e si nt h i sm o d e lc o m p a r e dt ot h eG Hm o d e l .
10In the GH model, the two agent receives the “split-the-diﬀerence” payoﬀ
in the equilibrium. As the opponent’s action changes agent i responds
by maximizing the “split-the-diﬀerence” payoﬀ. In our model, the op-
ponent’s level of investment ﬁrst determines the payoﬀ function that
agent i is facing. Then it inﬂuences the value of this function. We ﬁrst
note that the opponent’s investment does not aﬀect the value of agent
i’s outside option because the second period payoﬀ b φi is independent of
ex-ante investment choices of both agents. Then we ﬁxa naj,s u c ht h a t
agent i’s outside option gives him the highest payoﬀ.A s w e i n c r e a s e
the opponent’s investment, agent i’s response remains constant until the
“split-the-surplus” payoﬀ becomes equal the value of his outside option.
At this point, agent i is indiﬀerent between maximizing the value of
his outside option and the “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ. As the opponent’s
investment continues to increase it becomes more proﬁtable for agent
i to maximize the “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ until the region where the
opponent’s outside option is binding is reached. From this point on,
the agent responds by maximizing the residual payoﬀ. It is worth to
note that the status quo payoﬀsd on o ta ﬀect the agents’ payoﬀsw h e n
neither of the ﬁrm’s outside option is binding because both receive the
“split-the-surplus” payoﬀ. On the other hand, in a region where the
opponent’s outside option is binding, the status quo payoﬀ both inﬂu-
ences the level of payoﬀ agent i receives and constrains the validity of
the payoﬀ function.
In ﬁnding the agents’ response functions, we ﬁrst need to characterize
t h et h r e er e g i o n so fi n t e r e s ti nΠi (a1,a 2) as a function of a.H o w e v e r ,i n
doing that we assume that ﬁrms are symmetric in order to simplify the
calculations.














for every ai ∈ Ai, then there exists a monotonically increasing function
αi : Aj → Ai such that
i. j’s outside option is binding if ai ≤ α
−1
j (aj),
ii. neither outside option is binding if α
−1
j (aj) <a i ≤ αi (aj)
11iii. i’s outside option is binding if αi (aj) <a i.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
The ﬁrst assumption of the Lemma 2 is automatically satisﬁed when
the ﬁrms are symmetric. Otherwise, cooperation generates a smaller
total surplus than non-cooperation. The second assumption requires
that the marginal beneﬁtf r o mai does not change much with φi.I n
other words, the marginal private beneﬁt of ex-ante investment must
not be very sensitive to the second period payoﬀ.
(Insert Fig.1)
The α function divides the (a1,a 2) plane into three regions as in
Figure 1. In the northwest corner, agent 1’s outside option is binding,
in the southeast corner, agent 2’s outside option is binding and in the
between region, neither agent’s outside option is binding. On the 45◦
line both agents invest the same amount, a1 = a2. Given that they are
symmetric, the non-cooperative choices of q’s will be the same, so will be
t h ev a l u eo ft h es t a t u sq u op a y o ﬀs. If agent 1’s outside option is binding
then agent 2’s outside option has to be binding because of symmetry.
Both outside options, however, cannot be binding at the same time.
Therefore, on the 45◦ line neither outside options are binding. We now
consider keeping a2 at the same level as before but increasing a1.S i n c e
B1 (·) is increasing in a1,i fw ei n c r e a s ea1 enough we reach to a point
where agent 1’s outside option is just binding. That’s why the region
where agent 1’s outside option is binding should be on the northwest
corner. The similar argument applies for agent 2; the region where her
outside option is binding should be on the southeast corner. Thus, we
have
Claim 3 αi (aj) >a i. The area in which agent i’s outside option is
binding always lies above 45◦ line.
4 Equilibria to the investment-choice game
Given the solution to the induced bargaining subgame, we have deﬁned
Πi (a1,a 2) as the reduced form payoﬀ to the bargaining subgame. The
ex-ante investments a1 and a2 are chosen simultaneously and indepen-
dently at date 0 taking into account the outcome of the negotiation
12between agents 1 and 2. Given the reduced form payoﬀs obtained from
bargaining subgame, the Nash equilibrium to the investment choice game
is a perfect subgame Nash equilibrium of the full game. We concentrate
on the investment-choice game and characterize its equilibrium. A Nash




































for all a2 ∈ A2.
We introduce some further assumptions into the model before we pro-
ceed.
Assumption 3: q1 and q2 are complementary activities. φi is increas-
ing in qj.
Assumption 4: The marginal beneﬁto fai is increasing in second
period payoﬀ, φi.
We ﬁr s td e r i v et h ea g e n t s ’r e s p o n s ef u n c t i o n s .W ed e ﬁne ρi : Aj → Ai
to be agent i’s response function, where
ρi (aj) = arg max
ai∈Ai
Πi (a1,a 2). (10)
Since Πi (a1,a 2) depends on the region of choice space considered, it is
convenient to separately analyze these regions, ﬁnd the optimal action
in each, and then determine the optimal action which maximizes the
overall payoﬀ.
4.1 Agent i’s best response when his outside option
is binding
In the region where agent i’s outside option is binding his best response
is deﬁned as
βi (aj)=m a x{ˆ ai,α i (aj)} (11)
where










that is ˆ ai is agent i’s optimal investment choice when the initial contract
is not renegotiated. Given the non-cooperative choices of (b q1, b q2),a g e n t
i chooses ai to maximize his net beneﬁt.
Let aj ∈ Aj be deﬁned as, αi (aj)=b ai.I t i s t h e l e v e l o f e x - a n t e
investment made by agent j so that agent i’s outside option is just
13binding at its optimum. We assume that b ai >α i (0) so that there indeed
exists an aj > 0.N o ww ec a nr e w r i t eβi (aj) as
βi (aj)=
½
b ai if aj ≤ aj
αi (aj) if aj > aj. (13)
For aj ≤ aj,a g e n ti’s outside option is binding hence he chooses b ai.F o r
aj > aj , where his outside option is not binding at its optimum, agent
i chooses αi (aj) so that his outside option just binds.
4.2 Agent i’s best response when neither outside
option is binding
In the region where neither agent’s outside option is binding, agent i’s
best response is deﬁned as




{Ci (a1,a 2) − vi (ai)}. (14)
In this case, the agents share the total surplus, thus agent i maximizes
half of the surplus net of cost of ex-ante investment. We deﬁne
δi (aj) = arg max
ai∈Ai
{Ci (a1,a 2) − vi (ai)} (15)
as the i’s best response to the unconstrained maximization problem. By
applying the implicit function theorem we can easily show that
Claim 4 If ∂qi (ai)/∂aj > 0 for i,j =1 ,2,t h e nδi (aj) is increasing in
aj.
Next we show that
Claim 5 δi (aj) < b ai for all aj. The best response to the “split-the-
surplus” payoﬀ is always smaller than the best response to the status quo
payoﬀ.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Essentially, ex-ante investment, a, increases the value of the second
period payoﬀ, φ. When the agent receives the status quo payoﬀ he
obtains the full beneﬁt of his actions so he has greater incentive to invest.
14When, however, he receives half of the total surplus, he receives only half
of the beneﬁt so his incentive to invest is distorted downwards.
We have deﬁned ηi (aj) as the best response to Ci (a1,a 2) − vi (ai)
when α
−1
j (aj) ≤ ai ≤ αi (aj).N e x t w e d e ﬁne the critical values of aj
within which δi (aj) is the relevant response function.
Let a0
























.T h a ti s ,a0
j is the level of ex-ante investment of agent
j where agent i’s outside option is just binding when he maximizes the
“split-the-surplus”p a y o ﬀ. We assume that δi (0) >α i (0) so that there
exists a0
j. The critical value a00
j, on the other hand, is the level of ex-ante
investment of agent j at which his outside option is just binding when
agent i maximizes the “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ.I no t h e rw o r d s ,a0
j and
a00




Now we can rewrite agent i’s best response when neither outside





αi (aj) if aj >a 0
j
δi (aj) if a0




j (aj) if a00
j ≤ aj.
(16)
When agent j invests at small levels, aj <a 0
j,a g e n ti chooses along
αi (aj) so that his outside option just binds. For a0
j <a j <a
00
j ,h e
chooses δi (aj), where neither of the ﬁrm’s outside option is binding.
When agent j invests at large levels, aj >a
00
j,a g e n ti chooses along
α
−1
i (aj) so that the opponent’s outside option just binds.
4.3 Agent i’s best response when opponent’s out-
side option is binding
In the region where agent j’s outside option binds, i’s best response is
deﬁned as




{Hi (a1,a 2) − vi (ai)}. (17)
Agent i’s outside option does not bind whenever agent j’s outside option
binds. Agent i claims the residual and chooses ai to maximize the total
surplus net of the cost of ex-ante investment and the payment to the
agent j.W ed e ﬁne
 i (aj) = arg max
ai∈Ai
Hi (a1,a 2) − vi (ai) (18)
15to be the maximizer of the unconstrained problem. By applying the
implicit function theorem we can easily show that
Claim 6  i (aj) is increasing in aj.
Let e aj ∈ Aj such that α
−1
j (e aj)= i (e aj).H e r e˜ aj is the level of ex-ante
investment of agent j at which his outside option just binds when agent
i maximizes the “split-the-surplus”p a y o ﬀ. Hence, we rewrite agent i’s





j (aj) if aj > e aj
 i (aj) if aj < e aj.
(19)
For small aj’s agent i chooses along α
−1
i (aj) to make j’s outside option
just binding. For large aj’s, he chooses  i (aj).
4.4 The best-response function
N o ww ee v a l u a t et h ep a y o ﬀ function Πi (a1,a 2) at the optimum of each
region and compare them to ﬁnd the best response function of agent i.
We have shown that b ai >δ i (aj) for all aj.T h e f u n c t i o n Ci (ai,a j) −
vi (ai) reaches its maximum at δi (aj). Then, the function Ci (ai,a j) −
vi (ai) must be decreasing for all ai >δ i (aj),s oi ti sf o rb ai,t h a ti s
∂Ci (b ai,a j)/∂ai − ∂vi (b ai)/∂ai < 0. T h i si m p l i e st h a t ,w h e na g e n tj
invests at aj,t h ev a l u eo fa g e n ti’s “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ at its max-
imum, Ci (δi (aj),aj)−vi (δi (aj)), is higher than the value of his outside
option at its maximum, Bi(b ai,b φi)−vi (b ai).S i n c eCi (·)−vi (·) is increas-
ing in aj, there exists a level of ex-ante investment, say ˇ aj, which is lower
than aj and at ˇ aj agent i is indiﬀerent between choosing b ai or δi (aj).I n
other words, at ˇ aj agent i’s outside option at its maximum just equals
his “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ evaluated at its maximum. Thus we have
Deﬁnition 7 There exists ˇ aj ∈ Aj,s u c ht h a t ,




− vi (b ai).
We next need to locate ˇ aj. Below we show that the jump in agent
i’s response function occurs at the region where his outside option is not
binding.
Claim 8 a0
j < ˇ aj.
16Proof. See Appendix 2.
We know that b ai is greater than δi (aj) for all aj. Therefore, δi (aj)




j))is less than Bi(b ai,b φi) − vi (b ai).I n
order to increase the value of Ci (·)−vi (·) to be equal to Bi(b ai,b φi)−vi (b ai),
aj has to increase. Thus, a0
j < ˇ aj. In other words, when agent j’s
investment is small, agent i c a no b t a i nah i g h e rp a y o ﬀ in status quo
than the “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ by investing at high levels. However,
as agent j’s investment increases, “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ increases
because of the complementarity assumption and generates higher payoﬀs
than the status quo payoﬀ. Therefore, for small levels of aj,a g e n ti
continues to choose b ai even though his outside option is not binding.
Whether ˇ aj is greater or smaller than a00
j depends on the gains from
cooperation. Here a00
j i st h ep o i n tw h e r ea g e n tj’s outside option is just
binding when agent i chooses δi (aj). In other words, a00
j is the agent j’s
investment level beyond which agent i chooses to maximize the residual.
If ˇ aj is smaller than a00






.I f ˇ aj is greater than a00
j and agent i responds with
δi (aj),a g e n tj’s outside option becomes binding that implies that agent
i does not receive the “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ but claims the residual.
In fact, he maximizes his payoﬀ if he continues to choose b ai for values
of aj <a ∗
j.A t a∗





− vi (b ai), just equals the maximum value of his payoﬀ when
he receives the residual. For any value aj ≥ a∗
j,a g e n ti responds by
maximizing the residual, Hi (·) − vi (·).
Deﬁnition 9 There exists a∗



























− vi (b ai).
Before we present agent i’s response function it is important to note
that both ˇ aj and a∗
j are smaller than aj.
Claim 10 ˇ aj < aj.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Claim 11 a∗
j < aj.
17Proof. See Appendix 2.
The above analysis is summarized in the following lemma that de-
scribes agent i’s response function.
Lemma 12 If ˇ aj <a 00





b ai if aj ≤ ˇ aj





j <a j ≤ e aj
 i (aj) if e aj <a j
.
If ˇ aj ≥ a00










j <a j ≤ e aj
 i (aj) if e aj <a j
.
Agent i can have two types of response function depending on whether
or not he switches from maximizing the status quo payoﬀ to maximizing
the “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ in the region where the opponent’s outside
option is binding. If ˇ aj <a 00
j, then the jump in the response function
occurs in the region where agent j’s outside option is not binding. For
small aj,a g e n ti chooses b ai.A tˇ aj t h e r ei sad o w n w a r dj u m pi nt h er e -
sponse function. From this point on, agent i chooses along δi (aj) until
a00
j is reached. At a00
j,a g e n tj’s outside option becomes binding. Agent
i responds by choosing along α
−1
j (aj) so that agent j’s outside option
just binds. After e aj is reached, agent i responds by choosing  i (aj) (see
Figure 2 for the case of high degree of complementarity and Figure 3 for
the case of low degree of complementarity).
(Insert Fig. 2 and Fig. 3)
If ˇ aj ≥ a00
j, that is, when the jump occurs in the region where agent




he responds along α
−1
j (aj) so that agent j’s outside option is just
binding. For aj > e aj, he responds along  i (aj) (see Figure 4). Whether
ˇ aj is smaller or greater than a00
j depends on the B and v functions.
(Insert Fig. 4)
18In general, the game will have either a unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in which both agents maximize the “split-the-surplus” pay-
oﬀ (this occurs if ˇ aj <δ i (ˇ aj)) or no pure strategy equilibrium (when
ˇ aj >δ i (ˇ aj)). The following proposition describes the equilibrium of the
investment-choice game.
Proposition 13 If there exists a Nash equilibrium to the investment-
choice game in which neither agent’s outside option is binding, then it







be the Nash equilibrium in which neither agent’s











j (b aj),b aj
¢
cannot be equilibria.
Since aj > ˇ aj,i ti sa l s ot r u eb ys y m m e t r yt h a tai > ˇ ai. This implies
that agent j switches to δj (ai) at some investment level, ai,w h i c hi s
below ai. Therefore, α
−1
j (aj) never intersects the response function at
b aj.M o r e o v e r , δj (ai) is part of the response function when it is above
α
−1
j (aj).S i n c e b aj <α
−1
j (b aj),t h e nb aj <δ i (b aj).T h u s ,(δi (b aj),b aj) can






is the Nash equilib-
rium of the game, it must be true that ˇ ai <δ i (ˇ aj) <δ i (b aj) since δi (aj)
is monotonically increasing in aj. I ti sa l s ot r u et h a tδi (b aj) <  i (b aj)
which in turn implies that b aj <  i (b aj).T h u s ,( i (b aj),b aj) cannot be an
equilibrium.
The uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium depends on the positive slope
of the δi (·) function which arises from the complementarity assumption
that we made. As aj increases, there is a direct eﬀect on Ci, but also an
indirect eﬀect since the second period payoﬀ to both ﬁrms, φi, increases
in response to the increase in aj. The increase in φi, in return, causes ai
to increase.
Proposition 13 refers to the uniqueness, but not the existence of the
pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In order to determine if the equilibrium
exists we perform a comparative statics, the result of which we present
its results in Section 7.
5 Integration (1’s Ownership)
We consider only agent 1’s ownership under integration since the case
for agent 2’s ownership is symmetric. Under agent 1’s ownership, agent
1o w n sb o t hﬁrms and agent 2 becomes his employee. Thus, agent 1
19has the residual control rights over both ﬁrms’ assets. In our model,
t h i sa m o u n t st oa g e n t1c h o o s i n gb o t hq1 and q2 at date 1 under the
provisions of the initial contract. It is, however, still necessary that both
agents make the relationship-speciﬁc investment at date 0. Regardless
of the ownership structure, each agent receives the full private beneﬁt
of the ﬁrm where they are employed. Being an owner does not change
the structure of the payoﬀ function or change the ex-ante distribution of
surplus. Ownership only entitles the beholder the right to control assets
in unspeciﬁed contingencies.
Besides having the right to choose both q1 and q2 at date 1, agent 1
is also the only agent in the bargaining game who can credibly use his
outside option. The residual control rights give him the right to both
choose and implement q1 and q2. A g e n t2c a nb r i b ea g e n t1t oc h o o s e
her favorite q but she cannot quit the bargaining game and implement
t h es t a t u sq u oc h o i c e so fq1 and q2. Essentially her outside option is not
a credible threat in the bargaining game. Now the variable xki denotes
t h ec h o i c eo fa g e n ti under k’s ownership.
At date 1, agent 1 chooses q1 and q2 to maximize B1 [a1,φ 1 (q1,q 2)].
We assume that there exists a unique equilibrium to the q-choice sub-
game under 1’s ownership. Let
(b q11, b q12) = arg max
q1∈Q1
q2∈Q2
φ1 (q1,q 2) (20)
be the unique Nash equilibrium to this game. In general, the non-
cooperative solution (b q11, b q12) is ex-post ineﬃcient. Therefore, the two
parties can gain from negotiating a new contract. The rest of the analy-
sis is similar to the case of non-integration. The payoﬀ function for agent
1i sg i v e nb y
Π1 (a1,a 2)=
(





− v1 (a1) if 1’s o. o. is binding, (21)
and for agent 2 it is
Π2 (a1,a 2)=
½
C2 (a1,a 2) − v2 (a2) if neither o. o. is binding,
H2 (a1,a 2) − v2 (a2) if 1’s o. o. is binding. (22)
The assumptions of Lemma 2 are suﬃcient to prove the existence of
α11 (a2) which divides the space of (a1,a 2) into two regions such that,
20for a1 >α 11 (a2) agent 1’s outside option is binding and a1 <α 11 (a2)
it is not binding. The following lemma describes the agents’ response
functions under agent 1’s ownership.
Lemma 14 Agent 1’s response function is
ρ11 (a2)=
½
b a11 ifa2 ≤ ˇ a12
δ11 (a2)ifˇ a12 <a 2
.










11 <a 2 ≤ e a11
 12 (a1) if e a11 <a 2
.
Proof. See Proof of Lemma 12.
Under 1’s ownership, both agents have a unique response function
for any parameter values. This is because the agent 2’s outside option
is never binding. The jump in the response function always occurs at
ˇ a12 . For small ex-ante investment levels, agent 1 responds by choosing
b a11.A t ˇ a12,t h e r ei sad o w n w a r dj u m pi nt h er e s p o n s ef u n c t i o n . F o r
values greater than ˇ a12,a g e n t1 chooses δ11 (a2). Agent 2’s response
function is δ12 (aj) for small values of a1.A ta00
11 there is a jump in her
response function. For values greater than a00
11,a g e n t2c h o o s e sα
−1
11 (a1),
so that agent 1’s outside option is just binding. For a1 > e a11, she chooses
 12 (a1).
(Insert Fig. 5)
As in the case of non-integration the game has either a unique pure
strategy Nash equilibrium in which both agents maximize the “split-
the-surplus” payoﬀ or no equilibrium in pure strategies. The unique
Nash equilibrium exists if ˇ a12 <δ 11 (ˇ a12),t h a ti s ,i ft h ej u m pi na g e n t
1’s response function occurs to the left of 45◦ line (see Figure 5). An
argument similar to that used in the proof of proposition 13 shows that if
there exists a Nash equilibrium to the investment-choice game in which
neither agent’s outside option is binding, then it is a unique equilibrium
in pure strategies.
216 Asset Ownership and Incentives to Invest
We examined two ownership types; non-integration and agent 1’s own-
e r s h i p .I nb o t hc a s e st h ee q u i l i b r i u mt ot h ei n v e s t m e n t - c h o i c eg a m ei s
identical. Provided that it exists, there is a unique Nash equilibrium to
the investment-choice game under both integration and non-integration
in which neither agent’s outside option is binding. Since the same equi-
librium is obtained regardless of the initial distribution of the ownership
rights we conclude that asset ownership does not aﬀect the incentives to
invest in the case considered. There is ineﬃciency in the model because
of underinvestment. However, this ineﬃciency cannot be remedied by
reallocating the ownership rights. In deriving the above result we have
assumed that ﬁrms are symmetric. Now, instead, we consider cases
where ﬁrms are asymmetric.
Proposition 15 (A) If φi primarily depends on qi, then optimal own-
ership structure is irrelevant. (B) If φi hardly depends on q1 and q2 then
j’s ownership is approximately ﬁrst best ownership structure.
Proof. First consider part (A). If there is no complementarity in ex-
post production, that is φ1 (·) is only a function of q1 and φ2 (·) is only
a function of q2 in the sense that φi (·)=fi (qi)+ igi (qj), i,j =1 ,2
with i 6= j and  i > 0 is small, then under non-integration there is no
room for negotiation since non-cooperative choices are almost identical
to cooperative choices and ex-ante investments will be eﬃcient. Under
1’s ownership, 1’s outside option is almost binding for any level of invest-
ment and 2 will be residual claimant. Under 2’s ownership, 2’s outside
option is almost binding for any level of investment and 1 will be the
residual claimant. In both cases, ex-ante investments are almost eﬃcient
because for the agent whose outside option is binding non-cooperative
choice of q is almost identical to cooperative one and the other agent
maximizes the residual. Therefore, the optimal ownership structure is
irrelevant. In Part (B), let φi (·)=bi +  ihi (qi,q j), i,j =1 ,2 with i 6= j
and  i > 0 is small. In this case, under j’s ownership there is almost no
room for negotiation and ex-ante investments are almost eﬃcient. Under
i’s ownership j is willing to pay i to implement ﬁrst best choices. In this
case, if neither players outside option is binding players receive “split-
the-surplus” payoﬀs and ex-ante investments are ineﬃcient. If i’s outside
option is binding then j is the residual claimant. In this case j’s ex-ante
22investment is eﬃcient and i’s is almost eﬃcient. Under non-integration,
there is still room for negotiation and the result is similar to the case of
i’s ownership. Therefore j’s ownership is always approximately the ﬁrst
best ownership structure.
Result (A) contrasts with GH who ﬁnds that if there is no comple-
mentarity in production, asset ownership must be given to the agent
who undertakes the ex-ante investment. Result (B) is in line with their
conclusion.
Now consider the case where φ1 (·) is independent of q2,w h i l eφ2 (·)
depends on q1 as well as q2. There is room for negotiation under any
ownership structure because the non-cooperative choices of q diﬀer from
the cooperative choices. However, the diﬀerence in the surplus created
by cooperation diﬀers depending on the initial allocation of ownership.
In particular, the diﬀerence in the surplus is bigger the more distorted
the ex-post production choices are for any level of ex-ante investments.
The bigger the diﬀerence the more likely that outside options are not
binding. If q1 is not important for ﬁrm 2 then we have a situation sim-
ilar to part (A) of Proposition 15 above. If, however, q1 is important
for ﬁrm 2, then it is more likely that ﬁrm 2’s outside option is binding
under ﬁrm 2’s ownership than under ﬁrm 1’s ownership. When ﬁrm
2’s outside option is binding ﬁrm 1 becomes residual claimant. If ﬁrm
1 ’ si n v e s t m e n ti sm o r ep r o d u c t i v ea n de x - a n t ei n v e s t m e n t sa r em o r ei m -
portant than ex-post production decisions, then making ﬁrm 1 residual
claimant, hence, giving asset ownership to ﬁrm 2 is better. If, however
ﬁrm 2’s ex-ante investment is more important then ﬁrm 1’s ownership
may be optimal. While this result contradicts with GH, it is line with
DLC in that disowning an asset may give more incentives to invest in
a relationship. For, by removing an asset, bargaining power of the sig-
niﬁcant player is reduced while the bargaining power of the insigniﬁcant
one is increased, hence the signiﬁcant player becomes residual claimant
and his ex-ante investment is less distorted.
We stress the distinct roles played by production complementarity
(∂φi/∂qj) and productivity of ex-ante investment (∂2Bi/∂ai∂φi) in de-
termining the optimal ownership structure. The production comple-
mentarity essentially determines whether outside option is binding or
not. If production complementarity is not signiﬁcant then the initial
distribution of asset ownership does not change the outcome of ex-post
bargaining signiﬁcantly. However, if production complementarity is im-
23portant, then ex-post negotiation may improve the surplus created. It
is then the initial allocation of ownership that determines the magni-
tude of the improvement and whether outside options are binding or
not. The optimal allocation of ownership is determined by the rela-
tive signiﬁcance of production complementarity and productivity of the
ex-ante investments. If the degree of complementarity is high then we
have the Coasean result. Hence the model predicts the irrelevance of the
ownership structure in a vertical structures where the production com-
plementarity and investment productivity is equally important to both
parties.
S of a rw eh a v ew eh a v es h o w nt h a tt h ei n v e s t m e n t - c h o i c eg a m eh a s
a unique Nash equilibrium if it exists. In order to determine if the
equilibrium exists we perform a comparative statics, the result of which
we present in the next section.
7 On the Existence of the Equilibrium
It is apparent that the divergence between the cooperative and non-
cooperative equilibria is completely driven by the interdependency in
the second period production. The extent to which total surplus can be
increased through negotiation depends on the degree of complementar-
ity. We introduce a parameter into the second period payoﬀ function
φ to capture the level of complementarity among the two ﬁrms.9 Let γ
be an index of complementarity where γ ∈ [0,1].W h e nγ =0there is
no production complementarity. In that case, the second period payoﬀ
function φi depends solely on qi.A s γ increases the degree of com-
plementarity in the production of the two ﬁrms increases. In the case
when there is no complementarity, the cooperative and non-cooperative
solutions are identical. Thus there is no need for renegotiation. As a
benchmark, we ﬁrst examine the equilibrium when there is no comple-
mentarity, i.e. γ =0 . We then analyze how the equilibrium evolves as
complementarity is introduced. We make following assumptions:
Assumption 5: ∂qi (a)/∂γ > 0 for i =1 ,2. The cooperative choice





/∂γ < ∂Ci (a1,a 2)/∂γ, i.e., as the com-
plementarity between the two ﬁrm’s production increases the “split-the-
surplus” payoﬀ increases by more than the non-cooperative payoﬀ.
9In this section we restrict the analysis to the symmetric ﬁrms case.
247.1 No Complementarity (Non-integration Case)
Assume that γ =0 , that is, the second period payoﬀ is independent
of the opponent’s production decision. Then the optimal cooperative
and non-cooperative choices of qi are the same and in both cases the
value of the second period payoﬀ, b φi and φ
c
i are identical. As a re-
sult, regardless of whether or not he cooperates, the payoﬀ to agent i





, and they are maximized at the same level of ex-
ante investment, b ai =  i >δ i. Even though δi is independent of the
opponent’s ex-ante investment level, it is still lower than b ai since in the
“split-the-surplus” solution the agent does not receive the full beneﬁto f
his actions. In this non-complementarity case, αi (aj)=α
−1
j (aj)=aj,
which implies that agent i’s outside option is binding in the area above
45◦ line while agent j’s is binding below. In other words there is no
region in which neither of the agents’ outside option is binding. Below
we characterize the equilibrium to this game.
Lemma 16 If there is no complementarity between the two ﬁrms’ pro-
duction then (b a1,b a2) is the unique equilibrium of the above game.
Proof. See Appendix 3
Given that ˇ aj is in the region where the opponent’s outside option is
binding, the jump must occur at a∗
j.H e r ea∗
j is equal to b aj because of the




. The best response of agent i is to always
play b ai. In fact the jump in the response function is ﬁctitious. Because
of symmetry b ai intersects 45◦ line at b aj, so we have an equilibrium (see
Figure 6).
(Insert Fig.6)
As we introduce complementarity, all the relevant functions and criti-
cal points in the response function change. By using the implicit function
theorem it is easy to prove that b ai, δi (aj), αi (aj),a n d i (aj) increase
as γ increases. In other words, as we introduce complementarity into
the model, we obtain an area in which neither agents’ outside option is
binding.
25We argue that for low levels of complementarity, there is no equilib-









j (aj) if a∗
j ≤ aj ≤ e aj
 i (aj) if e aj ≤ aj.
When γ is zero, a00
i is smaller than ˇ ai. Thus, for a small degree of
complementarity a00
i is still smaller than ˇ ai by continuity. For that reason,
the best response function is the one above where the agent switches at a∗
i
rather than ˇ ai. The only possible equilibrium is the one in which neither
parties’ outside option is binding. Because of the reasons discussed in the
p r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 3 ,n o n eo ft h e mc h o o s e sα
−1
j (aj) in the equilibrium.
For small γ, e ai is greater than a00
i which means that  i (aj) is a part of
the response function when it is greater than α
−1
j (aj).S i n c e α
−1
j (aj)
cannot be an equilibrium then  i (aj) cannot be an equilibrium, either.
With small complementarity, however, ˇ ai will be greater than δi (ˇ aj).
That implies that the jump in the response function occurs to the right
of 45◦ line, so there does not exist an equilibrium where neither ﬁrm’s
outside option is binding.
Proposition 17 For low levels of complementarity, there is no equilib-
rium to the investment-choice game in pure strategies. If the complemen-
tarity between the two ﬁrm is suﬃciently large, then there is a unique
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. I nt h ec a s ew h e r et h e r ei sn oc o m p l e m e n t a r i t y ,γ =0 ,t h e
equilibrium to this game is (b a1,b a2). Now suppose that we force the
agents to receive the “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ. The unique equilibrium
of this forced game is (δ1,δ2).L e t Ai be the payoﬀ to agent i in this
forced equilibrium and Bi be the payoﬀ to agent i from deviating to a
point which enforces outside option. Bi is greater than Ai since Bi (·)
is increasing in ai and b ai >δ i. When the complementarity is small, an
interior equilibrium, if it exists, has to be close to the equilibrium of the
forced division game when there is no complementarity.10 Let Ci denote
the payoﬀ to agent i in an equilibrium where both agents receive the
“split-the-surplus” payoﬀ when γ>0. Finally let Di denote the payoﬀ
to agent i from deviating to a point which enforces outside option. We
10It follows from that the response function has a closed graph.
26know that Bi is greater than Ai. Ai is close to Ci and Bi is close to
Di which implies that Di is greater than Ci.T h i si m p l i e st h a ta g e n ti has
an incentive to deviate from the (δ1,δ 2)equilibrium when there is small
a complementarity. Therefore (δ1,δ2) cannot be an equilibrium. There
also cannot be an equilibrium where both agents’ outside options are
binding. Therefore there is no equilibrium when the ﬁrms’ production
exhibits small complementarity. The second part of the lemma is proved
in Proposition 13.
The intuition behind proposition 17 is the following. When the agent
receives the “split-the-surplus” payoﬀ, his incentives are distorted down-
wards. If we keep the opponent’s action ﬁxed, it is proﬁtable for the
agent to deviate and choose b ai to maximize the status quo payoﬀ.T h i s
is true for both agents because of symmetry. We cannot, however, have
an equilibrium where both agents’ outside options are binding. If we do,
this would imply that cooperation generates a smaller surplus than non-
cooperation. In fact, the only case when we obtain an equilibrium where
both outside options are binding is when there is no complementarity
between the two ﬁrms. In this case, the surplus under cooperation and
non-cooperation is identical. As complementarity increases, the agents’
outside options become non-binding, so the deviations described above
do not occur. Then the game has the unique equilibrium where neither
of the agents’ outside options are binding.
8C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper we analyze the role of the initial allocation of ownership
rights in transactions where parties make relationship-speciﬁci n v e s t -
ments and the contracts are incomplete. We compare two ownership
structures. First, we consider the case where the ﬁrms are separately
owned by agent 1 and 2 respectively. Then we analyze the case where
agent 1 owns both ﬁrms and agent 2 is employed in ﬁrm 2. In both cases,
when ﬁrms are symmetric and the degree of complementarity between
the two ﬁrms’ production is high, cooperation generates large surplus.
In this case, the investment-choice game has a unique Nash equilibrium
where neither agents’ outside option is binding. When the agents’ out-
side options are not binding, agent 1 and 2 split the total surplus in the
equilibrium of the bargaining game. Since we obtain the same equilib-
rium regardless of the ownership structure, the distortions in the ex-ante
investments are independent of the initial allocation of ownership rights.
27Thus, we conclude that the initial allocation of ownership rights does not
lead to ex-ante ineﬃciencies in the production. If, however, the degree
of complementarity between the two ﬁrms’ production is low, then the
equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist.
Our conclusion that the allocation of initial ownership rights is ir-
relevant partially extends the result of the Coase theorem to the rela-
t i o n s h i p si nw h i c ha g e n t sa r eu n a b l et ob a r g a i ne x - a n t eo v e ra l la s p e c t s
of the transaction, due to contractual incompleteness. This irrelevance
result also contrasts the results of GH who obtain that the initial al-
location ownership rights have eﬃciency implications. They argue that
even though ex-post bargaining is costless the impossibility of ex-ante
bargaining leads to the ineﬃciencies by distorting parties’ incentives to
invest in the relationship. The ownership rights should be allocated to
minimize these distortions. Thus, the Coase theorem fails to apply if
there is contractual incompleteness. The critical element behind these
two diﬀerent results is that while GH model uses the Nash bargaining
solution treating status quo payoﬀs as disagreement points, in our model
they are treated as outside options. It is worthwhile to note that, there
is an ex-ante ineﬃciency in our model, too. This ineﬃciency, however,
does not arise from the initial allocation of ownership rights but as a
result of free-rider problem.
In case of asymmetric relationship, we ﬁnd that, as in DLC, there
may be cases where taking away the assets from signiﬁcant partner may
boosts his incentives to invest. By removing an asset, bargaining power
of the signiﬁcant player is reduced while the bargaining power of the
insigniﬁcant one is increased, hence the signiﬁcant player becomes resid-
ual claimant and his ex-ante investment is less distorted. It is important
to stress the distinct roles played by production complementarity and
productivity of ex-ante investment in determining the optimal owner-
ship structure. The production complementarity essentially determines
whether the outside option is binding or not. If the production com-
plementarity is not signiﬁcant then the initial distribution of asset own-
ership does not change the outcome of ex-post bargaining signiﬁcantly.
However, if production complementarity is important, then optimal al-
location of ownership is determined by the relative signiﬁcance of pro-
duction complementarity and productivity of the ex-ante investments.
An implicit assumption in our model is regarding the deﬁnition of
ownership. We deﬁne ownership as the power to exercise control. It
28would be interesting to examine the extent to which the irrelevance result
depends on the deﬁnition of ownership. In other words, if we broaden
this deﬁnition to include the rights to the residual income stream, does
t h ei r r e l e v a n c er e s u l tc o n t i n u et oh o l d ?A n o t h e ra s s u m p t i o ni nt h em od e l
is that the relationship lasts only two periods. If, however, the relation-
ship lasts longer and the bargaining takes place concurrently with the
production, our results may diﬀer. In this case, the status quo payoﬀs
become the income ﬂow accruing to the agents in the course of the bar-
gaining. Then status quo payoﬀs can be interpreted as the disagreement
points. This bargaining game, however, may have many equilibria, some
of which are ineﬃcient (see Fernandez and Glazer (1991)).
9F i g u r e s
29Figure 1: The functions α1 (a1) and α
−1
2 (a2).
30Figure 2: Agent 1’s response function: ˘ a2 <a 00
2 (the complementarity
between q1 and q2 is large).
31Figure 3: Agent 1’s response function: ˘ a2 <a 00
2 (the complementarity
between q1 and q2 is small).
32Figure 4: Agent 1’s response function: ˘ a2 >a 00
2 (the complementarity
between q1 and q2 is small).
33Figure 5: Player’s response function under 1’s ownership.
34Figure 6: Players’ response function when γ =0 .
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Proof of Lemma 2: The lemma is proven for the case of i =1 ,a n di t
is symmetric for the case j =1 .I ti sﬁrst shown that condition 8 implies
















1 is the value of function φ evaluated at the cooperative choices.
Note that φ
c
1 is a function of q1 and q2.
Let M∗ =m a x
φ1
∂B1 (a1,φ 1)/∂a1 and m∗ =m i n
φ1
∂B1 (a1,φ 1)/∂a1.
Then by deﬁnition ∂B1 (a1,φ
c
1)/∂a1 ≤ M∗ and ∂B1(a1,b φ1)/∂a1 ≥ m∗.
35We have assumed that 1
2M∗ <m ∗.O n e c a n ﬁnd a suﬃciently small
δ1 (a2) for each φ
c
1 (a1,a 2) such that 1
2M∗ + δ1 (a2) <m ∗.T h e n b y
substitution we obtain 23.
Next we show that condition 23 implies that for every a2 there exist
au n i q u ea1 such that B1(a1,b φ1)=C1 (a1,a 2).W e d e ﬁne D(a1,a 2)=
C1 (a1,a 2) − B1(a1,b φ1).B y2 3 ,D(a1,a 2) is a monotonically decreasing
function of a1 and a2 and D(0,a 2) > 0. We show that there exists a













































− C1 (0,a 2)+C1 (a1,a 2)+δi (aj)a1.
If B1(0,b φ1)−C1 (0,a 2)+δi (aj)a1 > 0 then B1(a1,b φ1) >C 1 (a1,a 2).Thus
we ﬁnd an aH
1 >
h
B1(0,b φ1) − C1 (0,a 2)
i













1,a 2)=0 . I ti su n i q u es i n c eD(a1,a 2) is monotonically
decreasing for all ai ∈ Ai.
Having shown the existence of a unique a∗
i for all a2,w ed e ﬁne a





= C1 (α1 (a2),a 2) (24)
By condition 23, ∂C1 (a1,a 2)/∂a1 − ∂B1(a1,b φ1)/∂a1 6=0 , hence we can
apply the implicit function theorem. Diﬀerentiating both sides of 24














which is strictly greater than zero, since the numerator is positive and
the denominator is negative.
36The existence of α2 (a1) can be shown in a similar manner. Since it
is a monotonic function, its inverse, α
−1
2 (a2),i saw e l ld e ﬁned function.
By deﬁnition, D(α1 (a2),a 2) > 0 if a1 >α 1 (a2), hence agent 1 maxi-
mizes B1(a1,b φ1) − v1 (a1).F o ra1 <α 1 (a2), agent 1’s outside option is
not binding and for a1 >α
−1
2 (a2), agent 2’s outside option is also not
binding. Thus, agent 1 receives C1 (a1,a 2) − v1 (a1).F o ra1 ≤ α
−1
2 (a2),
agent 2’s outside option binds, therefore agent 1 claims the residual and
receives H1 (a1,a 2) − v1 (a1).
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By assumption 8, 1
2 [∂Bi (δi (aj),φ
c










right hand side is decreasing and the left hand side is increasing in ai.
To reach to an equilibrium ai has to increase, hence δi (aj) < b ai for all aj.
P r o o fo fC l a i m8 : At a0
j, δi(a0
j)=αi(a0

































































− vi (b ai)
since b ai is the unique maximum. By using the deﬁnition of ˇ aj,w er e p l a c e






















<C i (δi (ˇ aj),ˇ aj) − vi (δi (ˇ aj)).
Since ∂Ci/∂aj > 0,t h e ni tm u s tb et r u et h a ta0
j < ˇ aj.





− vi (b ai)=Ci (b ai,aj) − vi (b ai)=Ci (δi (ˇ aj),ˇ aj) − vi (δi (ˇ aj))
which is less than Ci (δi (aj),aj)−vi (δi (aj)). This implies that ˇ aj < aj.
Proof of Claim 11: At aj, Ci (b ai,aj)=Bi(b ai,b φi) by deﬁnition. a∗
j
cannot be equal to aj because Hi (ai,a j) >B i(ai,b φi) for all (ai,a j).
Since Hi (ai,aj) cannot intersect Ci (ai,aj) at b ai,i tm u s ti n t e r s e c ti ta t
some ai which is less than b ai. Hence α
−1




















− vi (b ai).
Since α
−1
j (aj) is increasing in aj, a∗
j < aj.
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P r o o fo fL e m m a1 6 :Note that ai = b ai by the fact that αi (aj) is the
45◦ line and by the deﬁnition of ai. In claim 10 we have shown that
ˇ aj < aj. Thus it follows that, ˇ aj < b aj.
We next show that ˇ ai >δ i. We consider the opposite, that is ˇ ai ≤ δi.
Then since αi (ai)=ai in the case of no complementarity, Bi(ˇ ai,b φi) −
vi (ˇ ai)=Ci (ˇ ai,ˇ aj) − v1 (ˇ ai). In other words, Ci intersects Bi at ˇ ai.B y
t h es i n g l ec r o s s i n gp r o p e r t yi nl e m m a2 ,Ci (ai,ˇ aj)−v1 (ai) ≤ Bi(ai,b φi)−
v1 (ai) for all ai ≥ ˇ ai. Hence Ci (δi,ˇ aj) − v1 (δi) ≤ Bi(δi,b φi) − v1 (δi) <
Bi(b ai,b φi)−vi (b ai), which contradicts with the deﬁnition of ˇ ai. Therefore
it must be true that ˇ ai >δ i.
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